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Ann Bostrom**
Introduction
Environmental and health risk communication researchers and
practitioners are apt to benefit from greater cross-fertilization between
fields. This paper demonstrates how research on risk perceptions,
decision making and environmental risk communication can contribute
to vaccine risk and safety communication. Breadth of the review is
preserved at the cost of some depth - to convey the rich variety of
empirical findings available to guide risk communication.
Uncertainty about vaccine risks and benefits spurs the need for
vaccine risk communication.' This uncertainty stems from several
sources, including lack of data, disagreement about its interpretation
and lack of biologically plausible theories to explain effects some
attribute to vaccination. Of greatest concern are rare adverse events,
including high-pitched, inconsolable screaming and death. As with
many technological and environmental risks, highly improbable and
sometimes poorly understood adverse events are at the heart of an
adversarial situation where existing communications appear inadequate.
* Based in part on a May 1996 presentation at the Vaccine Safety Forum workshop,
Institute of Medicine. Support from the Vaccine Safety & Development Activity,
National Immunization Program, Centers for Disease Control and helpful comments
from Bob Chen, Geoff Evans and Lynelle Philips are gratefully acknowledged. The
author bears sole responsibility for the contents.
** Dr. Bostrom is Asst. Professor, School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of
Technology. She holds a B.A. (English) from the University of Washington, M.B.A.
from Western Washington University and Ph.D. (Public Policy Analysis) fromCarnegie Mellon University. Email: ann.bostrom@pubpolicy.gatech.edu.
1 Yet, Dr. Robert Chen of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) argues that
benefits of vaccines are not uncertain, but rather the need for vaccine risk
communication stems from: successful reduction in incidence of vaccine preventable
diseases by immunizations, making vaccines risks relatively more prominent, well
documented benefits being "invisible" to the average parent; and uncertainty about
risks of rare serious effects of immunization. (personal communication).
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Part of this inadequacy may be due to contention about what
communications should convey. Those facing risk seem likely to want
information to help establish causality and responsibility. Ultimately,
this information can also contribute to development of safer vaccines.
Health experts likely want information corroborating the improbability
of adverse effects and the magnitude of vaccination benefits. Such
information seems essential to achieve high immunization rates. While
the benefits of vaccination are demonstrable, the near-eradication of
some diseases means that parents faced with vaccination decisions may
be unfamiliar with them,2 and have little basis for evaluating benefits.
Citizens have the right to be informed and participate in decisions
affecting their quality of life and health. Such decisions are more
difficult than those involving known risks. Development of theory-
based and empirically researched risk communication to support
decisions is a vital component of public health risk management.
Faced with the need to communicate about vaccine risks,
government agencies and private organizations encounter a host of
problems in succinctly addressing public concerns while conveying
meaningful technical information. In addition, the public health
objective of increasing immunization rates may seem difficult to
reconcile with increased efforts to communicate vaccine risks. Insights
from research on vaccine risk perceptions, decision making, and
environmental risk communication can help.
After a brief description of what is known about such matters, the
paper concludes with an illustrative research agenda for vaccine risk
communication.
Vaccine Risk Perceptions and Decision Making
Relative to what is known about many kinds of environmental risk
perceptions, little is known about vaccine risk perceptions. This is
despite a large vaccine literature, many active vaccine groups - and
recent attempts to address what in this literature and on hotlines appear
to be common misconceptions about vaccine risks.3 These include
2 Ricardo Alvarez, Daniel Sacolick & Maicie Wong, A Descriptive Study of
Parents' Knowledge and Attitudes Regarding Immunization at the Sunset Park
Family Health Center in Brooklyn (1995) (unpublished, Brooklyn Coll. Med.).
3 CDC, National Immunization Program, 6 Common Misconceptions about
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beliefs about the disappearance of diseases regardless of vaccine use, the
relative risks of vaccines and diseases, the potential existence of vaccine
"hot" lots, misunderstanding of base rate issues related to disease
incidence among vaccinated and unvaccinated children, and concerns
about overloading the immune system with multiple vaccinations given
at the same time.
Evidence for misconceptions along these lines can be found in
recent surveys of physicians, parents and adult patients. For example,
presented with a set of vaccination scenarios, physicians chose not to
immunize in over two-thirds of cases for which the American Academy
of Pediatrics or the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices
recommends it, because the physicians judged as contraindications
conditions not so recognized by those bodies, or they judged the risks
of vaccines as outweighing the benefits. 4 Another recent study of
immunization 5 found that nearly one third of parents had concerns
about a single injection, while more physicians than parents had
concerns about giving very young children three injections. Consistent
with these findings, a study by Askew et al. found that 30% of private
physicians interviewed agreed with the statement that "giving more
than one injection at a time increases the likelihood of side effects (even
more so than the combined risk of side effects if the injections were
given separately)." 6 In another study, the most common (34.3%)
reason for elderly patients' previously failing to received an influenza
vaccination was fear of side effects and shots.7
Vaccines: And How to Respond to Them (1995).
4 James R. Campbell et al., Intent to Immunize Among Pediatric and Family
Medicine Residents, 148 Arch. Pediatr. Adolesc. Med. 926 (1994) - erratum 149,
at 60. See also Peter R Loewenson et al., Physician Attitudes and Practices
Regarding Universal Infant Vaccination Against Hepatitis B Infection in Minnesota:
Implications for Public Health Policy, 13 Pediatr. Infect. Dis. J. 373(1994) and P. J.
Salsberry, J. T. Nickel & R. Mitch, Missed Opportunities to Immunize Preschoolers,
8 Appl. Nursing Research 56 (1995).
5 Kathleen A. Woodin et al., Physician and Parent Opinions. Are Children
Becoming Pincushions from Immunizations? 149 Arch. Pediatr. Adolesc. Med. 845
(1995).
6 George L Askew et al., Beliefi and Practices Regarding Childhood Vaccination
Among Urban Pediatric Providers in New Jersey, 96 Pediatrics 889 (1995).
7 R. Ganguly & T. B. Webster, Influenza Vaccination in the Elderly, 5 J Investig
Allerg Clin Immunol 73 (1995); Nicholas H Fiebach & Catherine M Viscoli, Patient
Acceptance of Influenza Vaccination, 91 Am. J. Med. 393 (1991).
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Two small studies have explored more generally how parents think
about vaccines. One ongoing study of the mental models of African
American parents in Pittsburgh has found some suggestive differences
between the mental models of parents whose children receive DTP3
(diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis) immunization in a more timely fashion
and those whose children are immunized later. 8 Those whose
children are more often immunized on time appear more likely to
mention direct exposure to the disease and a weak immune system as
risk factors; more likely to say that shots strengthen the immune
system, and that a series of shots is needed to get full protection from
pertussis; and less likely to say that poor health is a risk factor or that
shots act as medicine. In a much earlier, similarly open-ended study of
34 mothers carried out in England, knowledge of the effects of
whooping cough was very limited, including not knowing that it could
be fatal. 9 Some appeared unaware of vaccine risks; most were
unfamiliar with contraindications for vaccination and with the concept
of herd immunity. This study also looked at sources of information
and whether mothers wanted more information before making
decisions. A majority did, but without much consensus regarding that
information; risk statistics, after-effects of vaccination, and effects of
the disease were all mentioned.
Studies have revealed other influences on vaccination decisions. For
example, an "omission" bias has been identified in hypothetical
vaccination decisions, 10 as well as in other decision contexts. This bias
is essentially a perception that actions are riskier than inactions
(omissions of actions), and that vaccination, because it involves taking
an action, is riskier than disease, even if the expected mortality and
morbidity rates are lower with the vaccine. These results are consistent
with the general observation made by some groups that vaccination of a
8 Jeanette M Trauth et al., A Mental Models Approach to Parental Decision
Making Regarding Childhood Immunizations, Poster, National Immunization
Conference, Washington DC, April 1996.
9 C. M. Harding & K. J. Bolden, Whooping Cough Vaccination: A Worrying
Decision for Parents, 227 The Practitioner 283 (1983).
10 David Asch et al., Omission Bias and Pertussis Vaccine, 14 Med. Decision
Making 118 (1994); Jacqueline R. Meszaros et al., Cognitive Processes and the
Decisions of Some Parents to Forego Pertussis Vaccination for their Children, 49 J.
Clini. Epidemiol. 697 (1996) and Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Reference Points
and Omission Bias, 59 Org. Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 475 (1994).
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child is a "physical intrusion into a healthy body,"1 1 and with
physicians' preferences to "do no harm." Free-loading (relying on herd
immunity and choosing not to vaccinate) and altruism (vaccinating to
protect others) may play some role in vaccine decisions, but Meszaros et
al. have found that "bandwagoning" (doing what everybody else seems
to do) appears to be a much stronger influence than either. 12
In other countries, common circumstances seem to have led to
increases in anti-vaccine movements and disease outbreaks from falling
immunization rates. These include (1) salient cases of neurological
vaccination reactions, (2) outspoken and articulate advocates of non-
vaccination, and (3) apparent decreases in advocacy of vaccines by
medical practitioners concerned about vaccine safety and efficacy. 13
Parents are likely to follow physician recommendations, 14 or other
trusted sources, highlighting the critical role of providers in
determining immunization rates.
If these findings are reliable, a sizable, perhaps increasing, minority
of patients and providers either hold what experts might call
misperceptions, or they differ radically from experts in their decision-
making processes and beliefs about immunization.
Lessons from Perceptions of Health and Environmental Risks
Vaccine risks are in some ways more similar to technology-induced
environmental risks than to most other health risks. Like common
technologies, exposure to vaccines is wide-spread: Most states mandate
vaccination against diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, polio, mumps,
measles, rubella and haemophilus influenzae type B for children
entering school, but allow medical and religious exemption. 15 Vaccine
risks are also technology-induced and provide widely-acknowledged
benefits. While low-level side effects of vaccines are not uncommon,
11 David Pilgrim & Anne Rogers, Mass Childhood Immunization: Some Ethical
Doubts for Primary Health Care Workers, 2 Nursing Ethics 63 (1995).
12 Meszaros et al., supra note 10.
13 Eugene J. Gangerosa et al., An Historical Analysis of the Impact of the
Antivaccine Movements on the Control of Pertussis (1996) (unpublished CDC).
14 See, e.g., Nancy J. Binkin et al., Epidemiology of Pertussis in a Developed
Country With Low Vaccination Coverage: the Italian Experience, 11 Pediatr. Infect.
Dis. J. 653 (1992).
15 CDC, State Immunization Requirements 1993-94 (1994).
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risks that most concern parents are very serious and exceedingly rare,
e.g., the risk of contracting polio from oral polio vaccine (OPV).16
Adverse events attributed to vaccines by parents (e.g., brain damage
from pertussis vaccine) may be attributed to other causes by experts. 17
Such events are also so infrequent that establishing causality is
statistically infeasible. These characteristics are similar to those of some
environmental risks, where causal links are difficult to study and
establish, existing evidence is inconclusive, or at best suggestive, and
scientists and citizens may disagree. Other commonalities are large
inequities in resources, including expertise and information, and a
resulting potential for conflict between stakeholders, especially between
regulators and those who perceive themselves as victims of regulation in
a system that appears insensitive to differences in individual contexts
and beliefs. For environmental risks, the stakeholders are often
government agencies, potentially responsible parties (industry, who are
also employers), experts (who may be biased by their employment
circumstances), and potentially at risk citizens in local communities.
For vaccine risks, the stakeholders are also government agencies, e.g.,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and Food and
Drug Administration, those with commercial interests (vaccine
producers and health care providers), and potentially at risk citizens
(parents or patients).
Perceptions of risks depend fundamentally on circumstances: Who
is at risk, what the options for risk management are, who can and does
control the risk, the nature of the hazardous process and how these are
portrayed. Judgments of risk acceptability 1 8 depend on the
probability of an adverse outcome and its magnitude or severity, but
not these alone. For example, people tend to avoid ambiguity if they
can; a risk judged more certain (e.g., the risk from a known disease)
16 Peggy O'Mara, Vaccination: The Issue of Our Times, Mothering, Summer
1996, at 24. The risk of vaccine-associated paralysis of the person receiving OPV is
estimated at approximately 1 in 1.5 million for the first dose; see CDC, Polio
Vaccine Information Statement (1994).
17 S. Plotkin, Pertussis, 7 Vaccine 195 (1989) (editorial).
18 See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Risk Perception and Communication Unplugged:
Twenty Years of Process, 15 Risk Anal. 137 (1995); Baruch Fischhoff et al.,
Acceptable Risk (1981); Baruch Fischhoff et al., How Safe is Safe Enough? A
Psychometric Study of Attitudes Towards Technological Risks and Benefits, 8
Policy Sci. 127 (1978) and Paul Slovic, Perceptions of Risk, 236 Science 280 (1987).
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may be viewed as less risky than an equivalent or smaller risk that is
perceived as more ambiguous (e.g., the risk from a new, unfamiliar
vaccine).19 While people care what the numbers are (and
quantification may well serve to sharpen rather than resolve conflict),20
they also care how risks are managed and whether they have a say in the
risk management process. 2 1 Many argue that risk is socially or
culturally constructed.22
Perceptions are also shaped by cognitive short-cuts that people take
when they are processing information. These short-cuts, called
heuristics, can lead to predictable biases, as in the case of the "omission"
bias described above. So, for example, people's subjective estimates of
risks are often compressed, overestimating rare causes of death and
underestimating common ones.2 3 This may in part be due to the use
of "availability," using how easily something comes to mind as an
indicator of prevalence. 24 Very unlikely but catastrophic events are
memorable and may easily come to mind.2 5 Another relevant heuristic
is representativeness, in which people judge probabilities according to
19 Paul Slovic, Sarah Lichtenstein & Baruch Fischhoff, Modeling the Societal
Impact of Fatal Accidents, 30 Management Sci. 464 (1984) and Jonathan Baron
Thinking and Deciding (2d Ed.1994).
20 Illustrated in Meszaros et al., supra note 10; C. C. G. Lord et al, Biased
Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on
Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 2098 (1979);
see ago, Ido Erev et al., Vagueness, Ambiguity, and the Cost of Mutual
Understanding, 2 Psych. Sci. 321 (1991).
21 Fischhoff, supra note 18 and Francis M. Lynn & George J. Busenberg, Citizen
Advisory Committees and Environmental Policy: What We Know, What's Left to
Discover, 15 RiskAnal. 147 (1995).
22 See, e.g., Lee Clarke & James F. Short, Jr., Social Organization and Risk: Some
Current Controversies, 19 Ann. Rev. Sociol. 375 (1993); Karl Dake, Myths of
Nature: Culture and the Social Construction of Risk, 48 J. Social Iss. 21, n. 4(1992)
and Mary Douglas & Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture (1982).
23 Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Judged frequency of Lethal Events, 4 J. Exp. Psych.
Hum. Learn. & Memory 551 (1978). For a summary see, Baruch Fischhoff, Ann
Bostrom & Marilyn Jacobs-Quadrel, Risk Perception and Communication, 14 Ann.
Rev. Pub. Health 183 (1993).
24 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
andBiases, 185 Science 1124 (1974).
25 See Jeryl L. Mumpower, Lottery Games and Risky Technologies:
Communications about Low-Probability/High-Consequence Events, 8 Risk Anal.
231 (1988) (draws parallels between lotteries and risks from technological hazards,
pointing out that lotteries may be successful in part because they emphasize and
elaborate the details of the extreme consequences, ignore probabilities, stress the
notion of possibilities and emphasize absolute frequencies rather than base rates).
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similarity of (sometimes irrelevant) circumstances, ignoring prior
probabilities 2 6 - e.g., basing judgment of risk on the similarity
between two children, one of whom experienced a serious adverse event
after vaccination, could result in a highly subjective estimate of whether
the other would experience a similar event, neglecting to take into
account that such events occur very seldom. Here representativeness, or
forgetting to take base rates into account, could potentially lead to
serious misestimates of the likelihood of an adverse event. This heuristic
may be related to people's preference for stories over statistics: The
more specific the story, the easier to envision, and the more likely it
seems. In fact, the more details there are to match, the less likely a
given case will match another. For example, it is more likely that a child
will have a fever than it is that a child will both have a fever and an
allergy to gelatin used in a vaccine.
Goals for Risk Communication
As the above illustrates, a goal of merely educating risk
communication recipients about expert risk assessments or estimates of
the costs and benefits of vaccines is overly simplistic, likely to lead to
controversy and conflict and unlikely to address people's concerns.
The National Research Council (NRC)27 identified three kinds of
goals for risk communications: advocacy, education and decision-
making partnership. An advocacy goal would be to enforce or
encourage a behavior or belief. It can be argued that in so doing one is
attempting to persuade the public to follow expert advice. In education,
the goal is to inform. This subsumes a category of education that could
be called decision support in which the goal is to give the public enough
information to enable them to make decisions according to their own
values. The third kind of goal is to establish or foster a decision-making
partnership. This requires that the public be involved actively in risk
management and decision-making, including structuring the problem
and selecting management options. The first two have been more
commonly adopted than the third.
26 Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Daniel Kahneman, Paul
Slovic & Amos Tversky, eds. 1982) and Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, 3 Cogn. Psych. 430
(1972).
27 National Research Council, Improving Risk Communication (1989).
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Advocacy. Often, risk communication seeks to encourage people
to change behavior, for example, to vaccinate one's children; explicit
advocacy goals can be found in most public health messages. However,
when there is conflict, advocacy can be perceived as persuasion not
necessarily in the interests of risk communication recipients. Arguably,
and perhaps for good reason, to many health practitioners, "risk
communication" 'about vaccines means persuading the public that the
risk is vanishingly small and should be ignored. Sheila Jasanoff has
suggested that: "risk communication is often a code [word] for
brainwashing by experts or industry."2 8
Public education. One type of goal is simply to inform people
about the risk. Unless such goals are further refined, the kind of
information communicated can range from technical to arcane and
may not help the recipient. For example, simply knowing that AIDS
comes from a virus will not necessarily help one protect oneself
A more specific goal is to enable people to make informed risk
decisions. The kind of information that one disseminates in this context
should be geared toward risk control decisions. Information of the sort
provided in "6 common misconceptions" 2 9 can support decision-
making about vaccination if communication appropriately 1argets the
audience and is construed as trustworthy and relevant. 30 People are
likely to face two kinds of decisions about most risks: Those about their
own and their family's exposures, where they have considerable
individual control, and those in democratic government, where they
have limited individual control, but can contribute to the debate. This
is clearly true for vaccination decisions; people decide whether they or
their children should be vaccinated or whether to become active in
organizations such as Dissatisfied Parents Together (DPT) with a
public policy agenda.
Medical and participatory decision making. Participation in
decision making is the third kind of goal identified by the NRC. While
28 Sheila Jasanoff, Presentation, Symposium, Managing the Problem of Industrial
Hazards: The International Policy Issues, National Academy of Sciences, Washington
D.C 1989.
29 Supra note 3.
30 Id.; 6 Common Misconceptions targets providers but has not received extensive
empirical evaluation.
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public input and participation may be a goal of health agencies, their
activities and efforts don't always correspond. 3 1 Recent research has
highlighted the importance of trust and credibility in risk
communication. 32 Government agencies and officials may be less
trusted than many other sources, including media.33 However, surveys
show that people tend to trust physicians more than other sources of
expert advice. 34 Nevertheless, participation by the public in medical
decision-making is likely to continue to increase. Where patients are
required to give informed consent, 35 or decide for themselves how to
use over-the-counter treatments, 36 participation is inevitable. When
used responsibly, public participation can be a mechanism for
establishing the kind of partnerships critical to success of many risk
management problem-solving endeavors.
At the 1995 American Association for the Advancement of Science
meeting, Stephen Pauker of the New England Medical Center and
Tufts University offered a continuum of models for medical decision
making from the doctor's perspective. These ranged from MDMG
"Me doctor Me God" (the classic model in which doctors make all
decisions unilaterally) and its successor informed consent to various
forms of increasingly shared decision making (including the use of in-
depth videos about the nature and outcomes of specific medical
interventions), the use of decision analysis (in which doctors actively
elicit the patient's values and support multi-attribute decision making),
to the extreme in which doctors provide only guidelines and the doctor
plays a small, if any, role. These models exhibit the range of goals of
31 Caron Chess, Kandice L .Salomone & Peter M. Sandman, Risk Communication
Activities of State Health Agencies, 81 Am.J. Pub. Health 489 (1991).
32 See, e.g., Timothy C. Earle & George T. Cvetkovich, Social Trust: Toward a
Cosmopolitan Society (1995).
33 See, e.g., J. Marquart, G. J. O'Keefe & A. C. Gunther, Believing in Biotech:
Farmers' Perceptions of the Credibility of BGH Information Sources, 16 Science
Comm. 388 (1995).
34 David B. McCallum, Sharon L. Hammond & Vincent T. Covello,
Communicating about Environmental Risks: How the Public Uses and Perceives
Information Sources, 18 Health Ed. Q. 349 (1991).
35 Jon F. Merz et al., A Decision-Analytic Approach to Developing Standards of
Disclosure for Medical Informed Consent, 15 J. Products & Toxics Liability 191
(1993).
36 Helmut Jungermann Holger Schtitz & M. Thiiring, Mental Models in Risk
Assessment: Informing People about Drugs, 8 Risk Anal. 147 (1988).
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risk communication from least to most participative. One could argue
that public policy goals in a democracy should be more rather than less
participative, recognizing that participative decision-making about
immunization policy, for example, does not mean that stakeholders will
necessarily agree on how best to manage vaccine risks.
Ethical issues. Health risk communicators cannot ignore the policy
and ethical implications of messages. While exposure to vaccine risks
may be avoided by choosing not to vaccinate, this entails increased risk
to individuals and the community. Messages regarding mandated
vaccination may be perceived differently from those about voluntary
vaccination; infant vaccination of may be perceived differently from
vaccination of older children or adults. 37
Several ethical principles have been identified as important in
decision-making research on environmental and medical risks,
including the omission bias and the "do-no-harm" bias. 3 8 The last
causes reluctance to harm some to help others, even when the harm is
less than that from not acting. Such attempts to be fair, even to
unidentifiable groups, can result in unjustifiable judgments. 39
As mentioned, altruism, free riding and bandwagoning all had a
role in vaccination decisions in one study, but bandwagoning appeared
stronger than altruism or free riding.4 0 While it might seem reasonable
to appeal to altruism in vaccine communications (to not infect others or
to eradicate the disease), another recent study also indicates that such
appeals may be ineffective. Of a sample of 55, one person cited
community protection as a reason for preferring OPV over injected
polio vaccine (IPV), but none cited this as the only reason.4 1
In the context of immunization, it has been argued that Hardin's
notion of the tragedy of the commons4 2 is the appropriate lens for
37 Supra note 11.
38 Jonathan Baron, Blind Justice: Fairness to Groups and the Do-No-Harm
Principle, 8 J. Behav. Decision Making 71 (1995).
39 Id.
40 John C. Hershey et al., The Roles of Altruism, Free Riding, and Bandwagoning
in Vaccination Decisions, 59 Org. Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 177 (1994).
41 Personal communication with Jenifer Lloyd, CDC. The study is described in a
1996 working paper, The Feasibility of Incorporating Inactivated Poliovirus Vaccine
into the Childhood Immunization Schedule: Perspectives of Georgia Public Providers
and Parents, by Lloyd & Kris Bisgard.
42 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243 (1968).
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discerning the quandaries faced: Not to immunize may be optimal for
an individual if there is herd immunity, but this will lead to aggregate
failure of herd immunity. As indicated, some evidence suggests that the
"do-no-harm" bias may lead physicians to recommend vaccine deferral
or omission for individual patients if their risk is salient.
Informed consent is perhaps the most widely used paradigm to
address individual liberties in medical decision-making. Some have
argued that informed consent can be achieved with value-of-
information and decision analyses. 43 Others argue that a decision-
theoretic approach is inappropriate. 4 4 In this debate, knowledge and
expertise are key, but a focus on some kinds of expertise (e.g., health
risk assessment) may lead to an impoverished context in which other
expertise and experience are ignored in defining "informed."
Health risk communication designers have an ethical obligation to
account for available resources and constraints on their potential
audiences. For example, if local policies are inconsistent with national
health goals, they may hinder citizens' effective decision-making.4 5 If
parents cannot find an accessible and affordable way to vaccinate their
children, they may not, regardless of what communications about
vaccines have reached them.
Audience Segmentation
Communication cannot be effective unless it reaches and engages its
intended audience. Potential segmentation strategies include language
(e.g., use of English or Spanish in the U.S., level of literacy), stake (e.g.,
parent, provider or patient -or whether there is a current outbreak of
the disease in the community), social and economic context (e.g.,
whether the patient has access to regular health care), and stage of the
decision process (e.g., whether someone is merely choosing between
schedules or hasn't yet decided whether to vaccinate her child).46
43 Baruch Fischhoff & Jon F. Merz, The Inconvenient Public, Chemtech, Feb.
1995, at 47 and Merz et al., supra note 35.
44 Peter Ubel & George Loewenstein, The Role of Decision Analysis in Informed
Consent: Choosing between Intuition and Systematicity (1996) (unpublished, Center
for Bioethics, U. Penn.).
45 Designing Health Messages (Edward Maibach & Roxanne Louiselle Parrott, eds.
1995).
46 Stages of change models show that attitudes and behaviors shift in stages that
cumulatively result in health risk changes. See, e.g., David R. Holtgrave, Barbara J.
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Research on outbreaks attributable to the failure of immunization
programs in other countries or in sub-populations opposed to
immunization for philosophical or religious reasons47 illustrates that
several audience segmentation strategies may be appropriate for vaccine
risk communication. First, any one of several stages in health decision
processes may characterize a particular audience.4 8 Second, there are
multiple reasons for non-vaccination decisions. 49 Third, as described
above, in addition to parents and adult patients, some health care
providers may be concerned about effectiveness or vaccination risks.
Decisions providers and policy makers face, e.g., how to frame the
decision for a patient or parent, differ in many regards from those
faced by parents. Communications appropriate for some subset of
parents may not effectively address concerns of others - or of
providers. Fourth, patterns of community health risk communications
may influence decisions, e.g., when the media amplifies some kinds of
information and dampens or suppresses others, 50 or when there is a
tendency for media to link responsible agents and adverse effects,
rather than discuss possible risk reduction solutions. 5 1 Finally, the
most common approach to audience segmentation is demographic; 52
such an approach may enable communicators to target those with a
common language and culture.
Tinsley & Linda S. Kay, Encouraging Risk Reduction: A Decision-Making Approach
to Message Design, in Designing Health Messages, supra; J. 0. Prochaska et al., In
Search of How People Change: Applications to Addictive Behaviors, 47 Am. Psych.
1102 (1992) and Neil D. Weinstein & Peter M. Sandman, A Model of the
Precaution Adoption Process: Evidence from Home Radon Testing, 11 Health
Psych. 170 (1992).
47 See, e.g., Artur M. Galazka & Susan E. Robertson, Diptheria: Changing
Patterns in the Developing World and the Industrialized World, 11 Europ. J.
Epidemiol. 107 (1995) and Gangerosa et al., supra note 13.
48 See, e.g., Holtgrave et al., supra note 46.
49 See, e.g., Asch et al. and Meszaros et al., supra note 10.
50 Cf Roger E. Kasperson et al., The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual
Framework, 8 Risk Anal. 177 (1988) and Ortwin Renn et al., The Social
Amplification of Risk: Theoretical Foundations and Empirical Observations, 48 J.
Soc. Issues 137 (1992).
51 Robert J. Griffin, Sharon Dunwoody & Christine Gehrmann, The Effects of
Community Pluralisms on Press Coverage of Health Risks from Local
Environmental Contamination, 15 RiskAnal. 449 (1995).
52 Michael D. Slater, Choosing Audience Segmentation Strategies and Methods
for Health Communication, in Designing Health Messages, supra note 45.
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Effectiveness
While determining effectiveness of communications hinges on how
one chooses and implements risk management and communication
goals, there are also some general lessons that are relevant for most
goals. Although behavioral change is ultimately the goal for most health
risk communications, it should be recognized that a communication
can effectively correct misconceptions and fill in missing knowledge
(omissions) without changing the decision made by the communication
recipient. Uncritical assessment of behavioral changes may be
inappropriate, and is unlikely to reveal flaws in risk communication
design and implementation. 53 Recognizing that changes in attitude do
correlate with changes in behavior,54 assessment of comprehension,
beliefs and attitudes are appropriate approaches to evaluating risk
communication effectiveness, and may be informative even when
behavior change is the ultimate goal.
Determinants of behavior. Several theories of health-protective
behavior may be used to predict the effects of risk communication,
including the health belief model, 55 the theory of reasoned action, 5 6
protection motivation theory, 5 7 social learning theory5 8 and
subjective expected utility theory.5 9 One comprehensive model, the
extended parallel process, builds on these and holds that people are
unlikely to undertake a risk control measure unless they feel that they
53 Baruch Fischhoff, Treating the Public with Risk Communications: A Public
Health Perspective, 12 Sci. Tech. Hum. Values 13 (1987).
54 Min-Sun Kim, Attitude-Behavior Relations: A Meta-Analysis of Attitudinal
Relevance and Topic, 43 J. Comm. 101 (1993).
55 Marshall H. Becker, Theoretical Models of Adherence and Strategies for
Improving Adherence, in The Handbook of Health Behavior Change (Sally A.
Shumaker et al., eds. 1991).
56 Icek Ajzen & Martin Fishbein, Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social
Behavior (1980).
57 R. W. Rogers, A Protection Motivation Theory of Fear Appeals and Attitude
Change, 91 J. Psych. 93 (1975); R. W. Rogers, Cognitive and Physiological
Processes in Fear Appeals and Attitude Change: A Revised Theory of Protection
Motivation, in Social Psychophysiology (John T. Cacioppo & Richard E. Petty, eds.
1983).
58 Albert Bandura, Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive
Approach (1986).
59 Sharon Sutton, Fear Arousing Communications: A Critical Examination of
Theory and Research, in Social Psychology and Behavioral Medicine 303 (J. Richard
Eiser, ed. 1987).
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can effectively control the risk (i.e., response- and self-efficacy) and it is
personally relevant and serious. 60
Both contextual and individual attributes determine specific health
behaviors, such as vaccination. Vaccination rates may vary by socio-
economic status or race/ethnicity.6 1 As illustrated above, it is also
likely that most parents follow the guidance provided by their
pediatrician. If so, either the parent's decision agrees with the
physician's advice (e.g, the benefits of vaccination outweigh the risks),
or the parent has decided to follow the pediatrician's advice, without
going through an independent decision process regarding any specific
vaccination. When the parent perceives a risk or potential risk from a
vaccine and makes an independent decision, a risk behavior or decision
model may be applicable. These are also precisely those cases where the
parent is likely to be most motivated and engaged in the issues
surrounding vaccination, and where the parent may be seeking further
information about vaccines.
While there is little overlap between the extensive literature on
threat and fear appeals and the literature on risk perception and
communication, 62 there are obvious overlaps in their implications for
health risk communications. Psychometric research shows that
perceptions of risk acceptability are related to judgments of how
dreadful, catastrophic, and unfamiliar the risk is; 63 these dimensions
appear related to threat and fear. Controllability of and exposure to the
60 Kim Witte, Putting the Fear Back into Fear Appeals: The Extended Parallel
Process Model, 59 Comm. Monographs 329 (1992) and Designing Health Messages
supra note 45
Tangential, yet related, are cognitive theories of memory and learning. The
effects of common sense or "folk" models of physical phenomena and processes on
how people learn and behave have been studied extensively, see, e.g., Mental Models
(Diedre Gentner & A. L. Stevens, eds.1983) and Willett Kempton, Variation in Folk
Models and Consequent Behavior, 31 Am. Behavioral Sci. 203 (1987). The overlap
between these somewhat disparate areas has been examined in a few studies, see, e.g.,
Richard Lau et al., Further Explorations of Common-Sense Representations of
Common Illnesses, 8 Health Psych. 195 (1989).
61 See, e.g., Public Health Service Influenza and Pneumococcal Vaccination
Coverage Levels Among Persons Aged 65 years - United States, 1973-1993, 44
Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 506-507, 513-515 (1995).
62 For an exception, see, e.g., Neil D. Weinstein, Peter M. Sandman & Nancy E.
Roberts, Determinants of Self-Protective Behavior: Home Radon Testing, 20 J. App.l
Soc. Psych. 783 (1990).
63 Fischhoff et al., supra note 18.
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risk are also judgments that are predictive of risk acceptability.
Together, these bear a family resemblance to the notions of response
efficacy, which is defined as how effective responses to the risk will be,
and self-efficacy, which has to do with judgments of one's own ability
to control the risk, and may well be related to locus of control.
In sum, risk communication recipients need appropriate mental
models (i.e., a basic understanding of the underlying hazardous process,
including exposure, effects, and mitigation processes), the belief that
the risk is a serious threat to them, as well as the resources to control the
risk and the belief that they can act effectively to reduce the risk, in
order for them to consider acting.
Qualitative Beliefs
Mental models approach
Communicators need to know where a recipient is coming from if
they are to design messages not to be dismissed, misinterpreted or
allowed to coexist with misconceptions. The mental models approach
to risk communication is based on the fact that people interpret
information based on what they already know.6 4 Thus, to be effective,
risk communication needs to take into account what people know.
A four-step approach to risk communication based on people's
mental models of risk processes is outlined in Bostrom, Fischhoff and
Morgan. 6 5 This mental models approach provides a way of
discovering what people know and using it to develop risk
communication, as described in the following.
64 See, e.g., Michilene T. Chi, P. J. Feltovich & R. Glaser, Categorization and
Representation of Physics Problems by Experts and Novices, 5 Cogn. Sci. 121
(1981) and J. Otero & W. Kintsch, Failures to Detect Contradictions in a Text:
What Readers Believe versus What They Read, 3 Psych. Sci. 229 (1992).
65 See, e.g., Ann Bostrom, Baruch Fischhoff & M. Granger Morgan,
Characterizing Mental Models of Hazardous Processes: A Methodology and an
Application to Radon, 48 J. Social Issues 85 (1992). This approach has been used,
e.g., to develop and test communications for indoor radon; see Cynthia J. Atman et
al., Designing Risk Communications: Completing and Correcting Mental Models of
Hazardous Processes, Part I, 14 Risk Anal. 779 (1994); Ann Bostrom et al.,
Evaluating Risk Communications: Completing and Correcting Mental Models of
Hazardous Processes, Part II, 14 RiskAnal. 789 (1994); Ann Bostrom et al., Public
Knowledge about Indoor Radon: The Effects of Risk Communication, in Decision
Maldng under Risk and Uncertainty- New Models and Empirical Findings 243 (John
Geweke, ed. 1992) and M. Granger Morgan et al., Communicating Risk to the
Public, 26 Env'l Sci. & Tech. 2048 (1992). See also, Jungermann et al., supra note
36 for a "mental models" approach developed earlier.
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Mental models interview. Members of the intended audience are
interviewed to assess their mental models of the hazardous process. The
first part of the interview is completely non-directive, in that it does not
use preconceived response scales, and so lets the respondent structure
the response. The interview opens with: "Tell me what you know about
(e.g., immunization) and any risks it poses." The interview becomes
progressively more structured, but is still open-ended. Prompts follow
for exposure processes, effects processes, risk assessment and
management, risk comparisons, and personal risk. Effects processes
include the nature of effects and uncertainty about effects. Risk
assessment and management includes the sources of the respondents
information about the risk, as well as all aspects of testing and reducing
risk. Risk comparisons might be requested. The directive portion of the
interview has varied in the studies done to date. Photograph sorting
tasks, definitions of key terms, and hypothetical decision-making and
prediction tasks have been used.66
Expert decision models. Results of interviews are coded into an
expert decision model. The expert decision model for several studies to
date has been the representation of an influence diagram, is a directed
network showing the probabilistic dependencies between events in a
process. For more details, see the summarized influence diagram in the
paper by Morgan et al., 67 or the more extended diagram in Bostrom
et al.68 The role of experts is discussed below.
Diagnostic knowledge test. A test was developed based on the
results of the interviews and information from the "basic" level of the
expert influence diagram, which is hierarchical. The interview process is
so time and resource consuming that it would otherwise be exceedingly
difficult to sample a large group of respondents. The test results are
analyzed to provide profiles of what sets of beliefs people have and how
specifically they think about the risk, as well as what people on average
do or don't know about the risk.
66 Id.; see also, Ann Bostrom et al., A Mental Models Approach to the Preparation
of Summary Reports on Ecological Issues Related to Dispersant Use (1995) and
Michael Maharik & Baruch Fischhoff, The Risks of Using Nuclear Energy Sources in
Space: Some Lay Activists' Perceptions, 12 RiskAnal. 383 (1992).
67 Morgan, supra note 65.
68 Bostrom et al. (1992), supra note 65.
8 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 173 [Spring 1997]
Designing risk communication. As discussed, prior knowledge and
cognitive attributes, (e.g., heuristics, attentional and memory
limitations) affect how new information is processed. Risk
communication design can be divided into two tasks: content design,
and formatting. For a risk communication to be effective, both of these
should take into account how people process information. The content
of a risk communication should, as stated above, address recipients'
mental models, and include the basic facts about how to identify the
risk, and about exposure, effects and mitigation processes. The format
should highlight and summarize key information, and provide
information in a usable format. That is, the format should be
compatible with the structures of the decisions people face. Because risk
control decisions are made in several stages, communications should be
targeted carefully so that the recipient finds the information
appropriate for the decision stage he or she faces. Risk communication
design is discussed more extensively by Atman et al.6 9
Many other frameworks have been used to find out what people
know in order to incorporate it into message design, 70 under the
general rubric of formative research or audience-centered approaches.
Several elements distinguish a mental models approach from others,
including the formalization of an expert decision model and the formal
analysis of the open-ended interviews.
What Parents and Providers Believe
In the second section of this paper, a brief characterization was given of
what is known about parents' attitudes and beliefs about vaccination.
Little research on mental models of vaccination has been carried out to
date. Mental models research can provide not only measures of how
accurate and specific parents' mental models are, but how and why they
disagree with experts, and the nature of their disagreements. This
information is critical for risk communicators to enable productive
dialogues and to identify and characterize existing and potential
conflicts. In previous mental models research, many of the
disagreements with expert models that have been identified entail
conceptualizations of the hazardous process that are either more general
69 Atman, supra note 65.
70 See Designing Health Messages supra note 45 for several examples.
Bostrom: Vaccine Risk Communication 191
(i.e., not as detailed) than would permit informed decision-making, or
that are focused on aspects of the hazardous process that are peripheral
in determining the risk. In some cases, the hazardous process has been
confused with that of a similar hazard, leading to wrong conclusions. 7 1
Providers, while likely to have different mental models than parents,
may also have misconceptions that influence their decision-making. As
the discussion of provider illustrates, providers do appear to have some
beliefs about contraindications that are inconsistent with the beliefs of
immunization experts.
What Experts Believe
Two critical components of a mental models approach that have not
been fully explored are determining who are experts, and what
decisions people face. Previous research has not dwelled on this in part
because social and cultural structures provide stock answers. Experts are
often identified by institutional affiliations and training (e.g., members
of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices) that often
entails the extensive experience and long hours that researchers have
found enable people to excel at a task.72 Thus, by definition, experts
have more experience in structuring decisions and solving problems in
their field than others. They also structure problems differently than do
experts. 73 It may seem obvious, but it is easy to forget that expertise in
one domain does not translate into expertise in another. So it seems
appropriate to allow experts in a specific domain, e.g., pathogenisis and
immunology, to determine the structure of decisions others can make
to reduce their risks in that domain, because those experts are expected
to have the best understanding. However, experts are also subject to
cognitive biases, including overconfidence and a tendency to over
interpret data.7 4 Experts' judgments of risk may also differ depending
on their affiliation and professional training. 7 5 One approach to
71 See, e.g., Ann Bostrom et al., What Do People Know about Global Climate
Change? 1. Mental Models, 14 RiskAnal. 959 (1994).
72 See, e.g., K. Anders Ericsson & N. Charness, Expert Performance: Its Structure
and Acquisition, 49 Am Psychologist 725 (1994) and James F. Shanteau,
Competence in Experts: The Role of Task Characteristic, 53 Org. Behav. & Hum.
Decision Processes 252 (1992).
73 See, e.g., Chi et al., supra note 64.
74 See Fischhoff & Merz, supra note 42; NRC, supra note 27 and Shanteau,
supra note 72.
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addressing such biases is to have a decision analyst elicit the relevant
information for a formal decision analysis from experts, 7 6 and to
include experts from a broad spectrum of relevant backgrounds.
Although obvious, it should be emphasized that expertise in
immunology, for example, does not confer the expert with expertise in
risk communication, even that regarding immunization.
Quantijing Beliefi
In risk assessments and in many other contexts risk is often
expressed and viewed as a simple product of the likelihood or
probability of an adverse outcome times the seriousness or magnitude
of that outcome, with equal weighting on each. While extensive
research shows that this definition of risk will not work for public
policy, it is unlikely to be abandoned in risk assessment and analysis.
And although it is an insufficient definition, lay definitions of risk do
tend to include these two dimensions.7 7 Probability and magnitude
are both usually provided as numerical estimates.
As discussed, prior knowledge and cognitive limitations, (e.g.,
heuristics, memory) affect how new information is processed. There is
evidence that even simple numerical estimates - of population, for
example - rely on both domain-specific knowledge and heuristics such
as availability. 78 The metrics and mapping framework proposed by
Brown and Siegler 7 9 provides a model for how domain-specific
knowledge, such as that elicited in mental models research, and
heuristics, such as those investigated by Baron and others,80 relate to
the perception and communication of numerical risk estimates. This
framework rests on three tenets: (1) There is no one "real-world
estimation process." Rather, people use both heuristic strategies and
knowledge-based strategies to generate quantitative estimates. (2)
75 Richard P. Barke & Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Politics and Scientific Expertise:
Scientists, Risk Perception, and Nuclear Waste Policy, 13 RiskAnal. 425 (1993).
76 M. Granger Morgan & Max Henrion, Uncertainty (1990).
77 Wibecke Brun, Risk Perception: Main Issues, Approaches and Findings, in
Subjective Probability 295 (George Wright & Peter Ayton, eds. 1994).
78 Norman R. Brown & Robert S. Siegler, Metrics and Mappings: A Framework
for Understanding Real-World Quantitative Estimation, 100 Psych. Rev. 511
(1993).
79 Id,
80 See, e.g., Baron, supra note 38.
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These strategies may be used alone or in combination. (3) When
multiple strategies are used, results derived from competing processes
are weighed according to their predictive value. In addition, this
research has led to a decomposition of estimation tasks into
independent metric and mapping components. The metric component
focuses on the statistical properties of the quantitative dimension of
interest; the mapping component is concerned with how items are
ordered along this dimension. Both are relevant to risk perceptions,
given that mapping is the basis for comparative risk assessment within a
domain (e.g., which diseases are riskier than others), and metrics the
basis for overall risk assessment and comparison to risks in other
domains (e.g., how likely is someone who has had chickenpox to get
shingles later in life). Numerical estimates of risks are based on specific
circumstances (e.g., a reported death rate for the U.S. population in a
given year). In choosing which numbers to present, risk communication
designers should consider which numbers are likely to be relevant to -
and perceived as relevant by - the communication recipients.
Most risk communications include some statement of probability
based on some exposure or dose. In this context, it can be tempting to
use a verbal probability alone to simplify the presentation for the reader.
However, the communicator should beware. Studies show that the
interpretation of verbal probabilities depends on the context. 8 1
"Likely" in "likely to get AIDS" is unlikely to be interpreted the same
as "likely" in "likely to catch a cold." Specific information about or
frequencies of exposure may be understood differently depending on
whether exposure estimates are represented cumulatively or for single
exposures. There is evidence that people do not cumulate estimates of
single exposures at a high enough rate.82 However, larger numbers
tend to have larger effects, all else held constant. Thus, cumulative
estimates of risk are likely to lead to higher perceived risk than
estimates of single shot risks. 83
81 See, e.g., David V. Budescu & Thomas S. Wallsten, Consistency in
Interpretation of Probabilistic Phrases, 36 Org. Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes
391 (1985) and Thomas S. Wallsten et al., Measuring the Vague Meanings of
Probability Terms, 115 J. Exp. Psych. General 348 (1986).>
82 Patricia W. Linville, Gregory W. Fischer & Baruch Fischhoff Perceived Risk and
Decision Making Involving AIDS, in The Social Psychology of HIV Infection U. B.
Pryor & G. D. Reeder, eds. 1983).
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As mentioned above, numbers may well serve to sharpen rather than
resolve conflict. 8 4 When verbal quantifiers are used instead of
numbers, communication recipients may perceive that the
communicator is avoiding being specific, or intentionally obscuring the
facts ("weasel-wording" or "government double-talk"). Withholding
information has been a documented source of contention and conflict
for many environmental risks. 85
Many risk communications include comparisons. For example, in
the "6 Common Misconceptions" brochure the antigens in vaccines are
compared to antigens that result from the bacteria introduced by food
into a body.86 In making comparisons, the communicator should bear
in mind that risk is multidimensional. Which dimensions are being
compared? A simple comparison of probabilities may imply a
comparison on other dimensions, such as voluntariness, in which case
the reader may find the comparison unacceptable or uninformative.
Studies of risk comparisons to date have found that even the best
experts' predictions of responses to risk comparisons may be wrong.8 7
In the few studies that have been done of graphical risk comparisons, it
has been shown, for example, that risk ladders communicate differences
more effectively that pie charts, 88 and that choice of a range for a risk
ladder can be critical, because the location of the risk on the ladder
(high or low) has an effect independent of the information conveyed
about the absolute and relative size of the risk.89
83 Cf Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skil4ful Than Our Fellow
Drivers? 47 Acta Psychol. 142 (1981).
84 Lord et al., supra note 19; Meszaros et al., supra note 10 and Erev et al., supra
note 19.
85 Science Advisory Board, U.S. EPA, An SAB Report: Review of EPA's Approach
to Screening for Radioactive Waste Materials at a Superfund Site in Uniontown, Ohio
(1994) (prepared by the ad hoc Industrial Excess Landfill Panel of the Board).
86 CDC, supra note 3, at 29.
87 See e.g., William R. Freudenburg & J. A. Rursch, The Risks of "Putting the
Numbers in Context" - A Cautionary Tale, 14 Risk Anal. 949 (1994) and Emilie
Roth et al., What Do We Know About Making Risk Comparisons? 10 Risk Anal.
375 (1990).
88 John B. Loomis & Pierre H. DuVair, Evaluating the Effect of Alternative Risk
Communication Devices on Willingness to Pay: Results from a Dichotomous
Choice Contingent Valuation Experiment, 69 Land Econ. 287 (1993).
89 Peter M. Sandman, Neil D. Weinstein & Paul M. Miller, High Risk or Low:
How Location on a "Risk Ladder" Affects Perceived Risk, 14 RiskAnal. 35 (1994).
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Given the state of the science of risk assessment, it is important to
convey the uncertainties that exist in estimates of risk, although this is
difficult to do. There are different kinds and sources of uncertainty,
such as a lack of scientific agreement on interpretation of data, or a lack
of data. 9 0 There are also different techniques for conveying
uncertainty, including graphs, diagrams, verbal presentations, and the
presentation of alternative numerical estimates. Representing the
uncertainty in information can lead to changes in readers' perceptions
and decision making, including (1) focusing on the upper bound of the
risk rather than the midpoint;9 1 (2) de-emphasizing the uncertain
information and focusing on other, potentially less relevant information
when making decisions92 and (3) possibly attributing the uncertainty
to incompetence on the part of the source of the information. 93
Good risk communication necessarily simplifies and summarizes,
but this must be done cautiously. Risk communication researchers have
suggested including where to go for more information, or including
glossaries and appendices with more information.
94
Evaluation and Iterative Risk Communication Processes
The only way to insure that a communication is reaching the target
audience is to evaluate it empirically. Ongoing evaluation and successive
refinement of communications and communication strategies should be
incorporated into any risk communication program. 9 5 Risk
communicators should choose and prioritize evaluation methods and
metrics based on specific risk communication objectives, the nature of
the risk stakeholders, and the risk communication context. A range of
evaluation options is characterized in the following.
90 Uncertainty, supra note 76.
91 Kip W. Viscusi, Wesley A. Magat & Joel Huber, Communication of
Ambiguous Risk Information, 31 Theory & Decision 159 (1991).
92 Christopher K. Hsee, Elastic Justification: How Tempting but Task-Irrelevant
Factors Influence Decisions, 62 Org. Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 330 (1995).
93 Branden B. Johnson & Paul Slovic, Presenting Uncertainty in Health Risk
Assessment: Initial Studies of Its Effects on Risk Perception and Trust, 15 Risk Anal.
485 (1995).
94 Morgan et al. 1992, supra note 6.
95 Bostrom et al. 1994a, supra note 65; Evaluation and Effective Risk
Communication - Workshop Proceedings (Ann Fisher, Maria Pavlova & Vincent
Covello, eds. 1992) and Bernd Rohrmann, The Evaluation of Risk Communication
Effectiveness, 81 Acta Psychol. 169 (1992).
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A basic distinction can be made between message-based evaluation
methods, such as content or structural analysis of text, or audience-
based methods that allow analysis of the risk communication recipients'
reactions. 9 6 Surveys are perhaps the most common audience-based
method, followed by focus groups. Less common techniques include
think-aloud protocols, 97 in which a person is asked to say out loud
everything she or he thinks while reading a risk communication, or
making a risk-related decision. Audience-based empirical evaluation can
contribute to process goals as well.
Measures appropriate for outcomes such as reduced risk may be
entirely inadequate for assessing whether a risk communication has
corrected errors or filled gaps in a communication recipient's mental
model of the hazardous process, but may be helpful in assessing how
much decision support the communication has provided. Reduced risk
can be evaluated using self-reports of changed behaviors, observed
behavioral changes, or changed outcomes (e.g., changes in vaccination
rates or the incidence of adverse events, as assessed via surveys of
parents). While self-reports are easiest to collect, they can be misleading
and very inaccurate. Extensive research on how well people remember
frequencies of various behaviors has produced guidelines for improving
accuracy, but has also shown how erroneous self-reports can be.9 8 In
light of this, the relatively high costs of observing behaviors or
measuring changed outcomes look less objectionable. However, for
some risks simple assessment of changed behaviors may be
inappropriate due to variations in the relative costs and benefits of those
behaviors for individuals in differing circumstances.
Changes in mental models can be evaluated using mental models
interviews, 99 or, more efficiently, using questionnaires based on mental
models interviews. 100 Only those misconceptions and misplaced foci
96 Karen Schriver, Evaluating Text Quality: The Continuum from Text-Focused to
Reader-Focused Methods, 32 IEEE Trans. Prof. Comm. 238 (1989).
97 See, e.g., K. Anders Ericsson, Concurrent Verbal Reports on Text
Comprehension: A Review, 8 Text 295 (1988).
98 See, e.g., Barbara Means & Elizabeth F Loftus, When Personal History Repeats
Itself Decomposing Memories for Recurring Events, 5 Appl. Cogn. Psych. 297
(1991).
99 Bostrom, Fischhoff & Morgan, supra note 65.
100 Id.
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captured in the design phase are likely to be represented in subsequent
research results. Experts and non-experts tend to conceptualize
processes quite differently. 10 1 But lay mental models tend to share
common traits due to common cultural and physical experiences. 102
For this reason, small mental models studies with members of the
target audience are likely to provide a reasonable empirical basis for
questionnaire design. A potential obstacle is that any study of mental
models entails the use of an expert standard - that is, a
characterization of the risk that represents the consensus of experts
about the relevant risky processes and potential risk control
interventions. It follows that expert models formulated from several
perspectives may be appropriate, and should be considered carefully.
Improved decision making can be measured a number of ways,
including using metrics for reduced risk or improved mental models.
Hypothetical decisions based on scenarios may also be useful in
assessing whether a risk communication supports and improves
individual decision making (e.g., choosing between various schedules of
IPV and OPV). Decision making processes on a larger scale can be
assessed to some extent using metrics for process goals. Metrics related
to process goals include measures of attitudes and values - usually on
Likert-type scales, 10 3 credibility and trust,10 4 and rates of public
participation in policy decisions. Many attributes of risk
communication processes are likely, however, to be missed by such
measures. Political and cultural factors can be assessed, 10 5 but are
unlikely to be changed by a single risk communication, or even a
comprehensive risk communication program. Public participation in
policy decisions may not be measured adequately by participation rates,
which cannot reflect the degree of responsiveness and mutual respect
101 See, e.g., Chi, Feltovich & Glaser, supra note 64.
102 Katherine E. Rowan, When Simple Language Fails: Presenting Difficult Science
to the Public, 21 Tech. Writing & Comm. 369 (1991).
103 But see Baruch Fischhoff, Value Elicitation: Is There Anything in There? 46
The Am. Psych. 835 (1991).
104 See, e.g., James Flynn et al., Trust as a Determinant of Opposition to a High-
Level Radioactive Waste Repository: Analysis of a Structural Model, 12 Risk Anal.
417 (1992).
105 See, e.g., Karl Dake & Aaron Wildavsky, Theories of Risk Perception: Who
Fears What and Why?, 119 Daedalus 41 (1990).
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engendered by specific risk communications. When values are not
shared, negotiation and conflict resolution become critical components
of the risk communication process, and should be evaluated as well.
To summarize, in determining how to evaluate a risk
communication or risk communication program, the evaluator must
first determine or define risk communication objectives, then select a
mix of evaluation metrics and methods. Defining the objectives in
terms of relevant metrics accomplishes the first half of this selection
process. However, multiple selection criteria for evaluation metrics and
methods should be considered. Cost-effectiveness of an evaluation
method should be weighed against other criteria, such as timeliness,
and process effects. Evaluation should take into consideration that the
effectiveness of risk communication may vary depending not only on
the characteristics of the risk the communication addresses and how
that risk is addressed, but also on such factors as the context in which
the communication occurs, the size of the target audience(s), the
diversity of stakeholders, and the degree to which stakeholders share
values vis- i-vis risk-related behaviors and outcomes.
Risk communication evaluation is likely to be most informative and
useful when integrated into a comprehensive risk management strategy.
Two approaches that explicitly incorporate communication and
evaluation into the risk management process are the mental models
approach, 106 and the behavioral intervention planning guide. 10 7 Even
when resources are limited, risk communications should be evaluated
empirically; experience and research show that common sense and
expert opinion cannot yet adequately replace empirical evaluation. 10 8
Implications for Further Research
This review illustrates many ways structured research for vaccine
risk perception and communication could improve communication.
One of many possible agendas is proposed here. It reflects perception
and communication topics that could, in the author's judgment, most
benefit vaccine risk communicators and others
106 Morgan et al. 1992, supra note 65.
107 Galen E. Cole, David R. Holtgrave & Nilka M. Rios, Systematic Development
Trans-Theoretically based Behavioral Risk Management Programs, 4 Risk 67
11993).108 See, e.g., Roth et al., supra note 87.
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Step one: Audience targeting and segmentation. Audiences are
often targeted by language groups or ethnicity but may also be targeted
by other individual or contextual attributes. To whom should vaccine
risk communications be addressed - segments of the public, or
providers? Many studies show that significant percentages of providers
evidence misconceptions or disagreement with immunization experts,
e,g, regarding appropriate vaccination contraindications. Because they
sample an audience probably self-selected for concern about vaccine
risks, Asch et al. 10 9 may have set an upper bound on percentages of the
public that hold some common beliefs about and attitudes toward
vaccines that may lead to non-vaccination decisions.
Step two: Qualitative risk. Very little is known of common beliefs
about immunization and vaccines, including correct beliefs, knowledge
gaps, misconceptions and disagreements with experts. Some evidence
suggests widespread knowledge gaps about the effects of diseases and
vaccines. Combing the literature/media is one way of investigating
what beliefs are held, but this may miss segments of the population that
are not well represented in the media. Research on expert decision
models of the underlying hazardous processes is also lacking.
Step three: Quantitative risk. How should vaccine risks be
quantified in risk messages? Research illustrates that the specific context
and format of numerical estimates can influence perceptions,
dramatically. Current vaccine communications provide odds ratios of
various kinds, e.g., a 1994 Vaccine Information Statement (VIS) for
measles mumps and rubella vaccines states that there is a 5-15% risk of
a rash in the first or second weeks after the first dose, or verbal
probability statements (in the same VIS the risk of seizure is described
as "rare"). CDC's publication on misconceptions110 and a recent issue
of Mothering,11 1 both provide comparative tables. Research is needed
on how these are perceived and on the overall effects of various
representations.
Step four: Communicating uncertainty. As illustrated, current
vaccine risk communications convey uncertainty both explicitly, by use
109 Asch, supra note 10.
110 CDC, supra note 3.
111 O'Mara, supra note 16.
8 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 173 [Spring 1997]
of ranges, and implicitly, by use of verbal probability statements. The
effects of these on beliefs, attitudes and decision-making should be
evaluated. Further research is needed on how to convey uncertainty
appropriately, e.g., how to convey the magniture of uncertainty implied
by the description of risk as "rare."
Step five: Increasing information input and exchange. As Chess et
al. 1 12 discovered in the state level, government agencies with laudable
goals may actually spend most of their time responding to inquiries,
rather than initiating dialogue. Ways to increase and evaluate public
input into and dialogue about vaccine safety research and vaccine risk
management deserve more attention. Cursory evaluation of phone calls
to the CDC regarding vaccine safety showed most (62%) to be from
providers. 113 Further evaluation of such information could help
agencies improve outreach. How to incorporate stakeholder input,
evaluation and revision into an effective vaccine risk communication
strategy deserves further consideration.
Step six: Incorporating evaluation. No expert can accurately
predict effects of risk messages. Empirical evaluation should be
included as an integral part of any risk communication effort. Ongoing
research on the Vaccine Information Pamphlets and their successors,
the Vaccine Information Statements, are likely to augment
considerably what is known about vaccine risk perception and
communication. Integrating evaluation of vaccine risk communication
efforts into evaluations of vaccine risk management efforts is warranted.
112 Chess, supra note 31.
113 Penny Hatcher, Comments and Recommendations (CDC 1993) (summary of a
2.5 week phone survey during 1993).
